C|M|LAW Prof & Alumni Win Sixth Circuit Appeal and Protect Teachers’ Rights

Congratulations to our Clinic faculty and two recent law student graduates.  They helped create an important precedent to protect teachers in Tennessee, Kentucky, Michigan and Ohio from losing their civil rights.  The case is Smith v. Perkins Board of Education, No. 12-3187 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2013), which is recommended for full text publication.

Professor Ed Kramer of the C|M|LAW Fair Housing Clinic and attorneys Jeremy Samuels and Brad Eier, former students in the Clinic, filed a brief in the federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, asserting that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the defendant School Board.  Carol Smith, who at 71 was the oldest teacher in the school system when she was fired, alleged wrongful termination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, retaliation, age discrimination in violation of ORC 4112.14, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The trial court found that the ADA and retaliation claims were barred because a state administrative agency decided that Ms. Smith was terminated for just cause, so collateral estoppel applied.  The Sixth Circuit held that an unreviewed finding by a state administrative agency was not binding on the federal court via the doctrine of collateral estoppel in an Americans with Disabilities Act claim.   Because ORC 4112.14 specifically provided that such an agency decision would preclude a lawsuit under that statute, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision as to the age discrimination claim.

This decision is important because Ohio teachers will no longer lose their rights under the federal civil rights laws if they follow the state termination procedure.  This case established that Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986) applies to the ADA, and the Sixth Circuit follows other Circuits disallowing the use of estoppel or res judicata to bar these independent claims.

Another important part of the decision was the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the District Court improperly granted summary judgment sua sponte to the defendant on alternative grounds.    The defendant only asserted the collateral estoppel argument, so the plaintiff did not have notice that the court would decide based upon the grounds it did.    ( The district court addressed Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodations claim on the merits, finding that Plaintiff’s requested accommodations were either provided to her or were unreasonable.  The district court also determined that Plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress had not been sufficiently pleaded.)  Also,  the plaintiff did not have an opportunity for full discovery before the trial court reached its decision.